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STUDENT COMMENT
International Commercial Arbitration: The
Nonarbitrable Subject Matter Defense
JAYNE C. ZALL*
INTRODUCTION
International commercial arbitration is slowly emerging as a vi-
able alternative to traditional litigation as a means of resolving dis-
putes between parties to a transnational contract. Many business-
men prefer to submit their differences to arbitration because they
believe that national court systems do not provide commercially de-
sirable forums in which to settle international business disputes. It
should be stressed, however, that the arbitration process is still
fraught with many obstacles and should not be viewed as a panacea
to be included in every international contract. For example, arbitra-
tion is not necessarily less expensive than the litigation process, nor
is it always more expeditious.' There are still instances when arbitra-
tion constitutes nothing more than the first step of a conflict resolu-
tion which inevitably finds its way to the courtroom.2
Despite the potential disadvantages mentioned above, arbitra-
tion can be extremely valuable when the arbitration clause in the
contract has been carefully drafted to reflect the specific needs of the
respective parties. Recent court decisions indicate that the arbitra-
tion process is being applied more consistently, and arbitration
clauses are being stringently enforced with few exceptions. This is
* B.A., 1977, University of Denver; J.D. candidate, 1980, University of Denver
College of Law.
1. The cost of arbitration proceedings under the International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC) is based on a graduated percentage of the amount of the dispute. A case
involving a claim of $1,200,000 which is decided before three arbitrators would cost
between $39,125 and $110,350, including registration fees, arbitration fees, and ad-
ministrative charges. This amount does not include, however, additional attorney
fees, expert witness fees, travel expenses, etc. See ICC Arbitration: The International
Solution to International Business Disputes, ICC Publication 301, ICC Services
S.A.R.L. 1977.
2. This is especially true if one of the defenses enumerated in Article V of the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards is proven. See note 3 infra.
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primarily the result of the United States' ratification and subsequent
implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention), 3 as
evidenced by the 1970 amendments' to the Federal Arbitration Act
of 1925. 5 United States courts are no longer quite so fearful of having
their powers usurped by arbitration proceedings. Furthermore, the
International Chamber of Commerce has facilitated the arbitration
process by formulating uniform rules of procedure which help to pro-
vide predictability as well as to diminish the possibility of an inequi-
table result.' The purpose of this comment is twofold: (1) to trace
3. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
opened for signature June 10, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter
cited as Convention]. For an excellent analysis of the Convention see Quigley, Con-
vention on Foreign Arbitral Awards 58 A.B.A.J. 821 (1972). For a recent review of the
Convention, see Sanders, A Twenty Year's Review of the Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L LAw. 269 (1979).
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, done at Washington, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270,
T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, represents another multinational attempt to set-
tle disputes through arbitration. This convention, which does not apply to private
parties, concerns disputes between a foreign investor and a host state. For an analy-
sis of this treaty, see Coil, United States Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Against
Sovereign States: Implications of the I.C.S.I.D. Convention, 17 HARv. IN r'L L. J. 401
(1976).
The European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, done Apr.
21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349, and the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, OAS/Ser. A/20 (SEPF), 14 INr'L LEGAL MATERIALS 336 (1975)
represent regional efforts to achieve uniformity in international commercial arbitra-
tion procedures. For an analysis of the Inter-American Convention, see Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Arbitration, The Inter-American Con-
vention on International Commercial Arbitration, 9 LAw. Am. 43 (1977).
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1976).
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
6. The ICC created the Court of Arbitration in 1922. The Court is comprised of
five Vice-Chairmen, a Secretary General, technical advisers chosen by the ICC Coun-
cil, and members appointed by ICC National Committees and Councils. The Court
does not settle the dispute itself; rather it supervises the application of the ICC Rules
of Conciliation and Arbitration (Rules) by the arbitrator(s) named in each individual
case. Other functions of the Court include: (1) taking any necessary measures with
regard to appointing, replacing, or challenging the arbitrators; (2) determining the
place of arbitration when the parties have not already done so; (3) determining if a
binding arbitration clause exists between the parties, in the event of a challenge; (4)
ensuring that the arbitrators' terms of reference are drafted without delay; (5) setting
a time limitation at which the arbitration shall proceed in the event that one of the
parties refuses to sign the terms of reference; (6) extending time limits for making the
award, if necessary; (7) scrutinizing the draft award to determine if modifications are
required, and/or drawing the arbitrators' attention to points concerning the merits of
the case without in any way affecting their liberty of decision; and (8) determining
the amount of deposit to be made at the commencement of the proceeding and the
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the development of the factors which ultimately resulted in the seri-
ousness with which the judicial system now interprets international
commercial arbitration clauses; and (2) to outline the remaining (al-
beit narrow) defenses to foreign arbitral awards. In particular, the
construction of the nonarbitral subject matter defense as interpreted
by United States courts will be examined in a national and interna-
tional context.
The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses and the Geneva Con-
vention of the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards
The 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses7 and the 1927
Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards8
represented the first major multilateral efforts to uniformly recognize
arbitral awards as binding. The Protocol recognized as valid and ir-
revocable all existing and future agreements to arbitrate between na-
tionals of Contracting States.' Under the Protocol, the arbitration
agreement could concern any matter capable of settlement by arbi-
tration. However, the Contracting States could reserve the right to
limit the arbitrability of a dispute only to those agreements which
were commercial in nature."0 Where a suit was brought despite an
arbitration agreement, courts were required to stay proceedings
pending arbitration." Awards would only be enforced in accordance
with the law of the forum state. 2
The Geneva Convention was supplementary to the Protocol, and
applied only to arbitral awards made pursuant to the Protocol. Arti-
cle 1 of the Geneva Convention provides that submission to the arbi-
tration be "recognized as binding and shall be enforced in accor-
dance with the rules of the procedure of the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties to which the present Convention applies
costs of the arbitration, in accordance with the schedule annexed to the Rules. Supra
note 1, at 13.
The ICC boasts a high rate of success-over 90% of the awards made by the ICC
are settled promptly and without question. This is partially attributed to the ICC
Rules which are regularly revised to adapt to changes and developments in interna-
tional commercial relationships. Id. at 11.
7. Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, adopted Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S.
158 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol].
8. Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, adopted
Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. For a discussion of
the Geneva Protocol and the Geneva Convention, see Contini, International Commer-
cial Arbitration, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 287-90 (1959).
9. Geneva Protocol, art. 1, note 7 supra.
10. Id.
11. Id. art. 4.
12. Id. art. 3.
1980
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and between persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of one of the
High Contracting Parties."' 3 Furthermore, Article I lists five defenses
which may be raised against enforcement and recognition of arbitral
awards, one of the most significant of which is as follows:
(b) that the subject matter of the award is capable of settle-
ment by arbitration under the law of the country in which the
award is sought to be relied upon."
Article 2 lists three more exceptions, including annulment by the
country in which the award was made, notice requirements, and
matters which do not fall within the terms of the submission to arbi-
tration.3 The remaining articles deal with enforcement and defense
procedures." The United States is not a party to either the Proto-
col or the Geneva Convention, primarily because accession would
have conflicted with the arbitration statutes of the several states at
the time.
The New York Convention
The 1958 New York Convention on Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards'" represented a culmination of in-
creasing international support for the use of commercial arbitration.
Adopted and signed by twenty-three of forty-five countries partici-
pating in the U.N. Convention on Commercial Arbitration, the New
York Convention signified an international desire to unify the law so
as to give full effect to international arbitration agreements outside
of the countries where they were formulated. Article V of the New
York Convention is essentially an evolution of Articles 1 and 2 of the
Geneva Convention, in that it lists different defenses to foreign arbi-
tral awards. The New York Convention, however, provides that only
two of these defenses may be raised ex officio by a court of the state
requested to enforce an award:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settle-
ment by arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be con-
trary to the public policy of that country."
Although the United States participated in the conference, it did not
sign the New York Convention for the following reasons: (1) if the
United States ratified the Convention in a manner which would
13. Geneva Convention, art. 1, note 8 supra.
14. Id. art. 1(b).
15. Id. art. 2(a)-(c).
16. Id. arts. 3-11.
17. See note 3 supra.
18. Id. art. V(2)(a)-(b).
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avoid conflict with state laws, there would be no meaningful advan-
tages to be gained; (2) if it ratified in a manner that assured such
advantages, it would override a majority of state arbitration laws;
(3) the United States lacked an adequate legal basis to accept an
international convention dealing with this subject matter; and (4)
the New York Convention endorsed principles of arbitration law that
would be undesirable for the United States to embrace.'
In 1968, prompted by increased private support for an interna-
tional agreement that would support commercial arbitration, Presi-
dent Johnson submitted the Convention to the Senate, which in turn
gave its advice and consent to ratification. Accession was delayed
until the necessary legislation could be implemented. After legisla-
tion was enacted that amended the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
and clarified existing law and procedures pursuant to the objectives
of the Convention, the United States fully ratified the United Na-
tions Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards on February 1, 1971.
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
Historically, the United States courts have reacted with hostil-
ity to arbitration agreements, fearing that their jurisdiction was be-
ing circumvented. Finally in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act (1925
Act) 0 was enacted which declared arbitral agreements to be "valid,
irrevocable and enforceable."'" Unfortunately, it was several years
before arbitration agreements received consistent treatment in the
courts. In 1959, the Second Circuit held in Robert Lawrence Co. v.
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.21 that the 1925 Act created federal rather
than state law, and in Prima Paint Corp. v. Conklin" the Supreme
Court finally upheld this construction of the 1925 Act.
The 1925 Act provides for enforcement of arbitration agreements
in the federal courts, and permits the federal court in the district in
which the award was rendered to confirm the award.24 It also pro-
vides for the staying of litigation instituted by one party in defense
of an arbitration agreement between the parties.Y However, under
the 1925 Act a party must satisfy all the usual requirements to gain
19. See Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius:
United States Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. U. L. REv. 1, 4 (1971).
20. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
21. Id. § 2.
22. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
23. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
24. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1976).
25. Id. § 3.
1980
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access to the federal courts."8 Furthermore, arbitration clauses in in-
ternational contracts which do not affect the foreign "commerce" of
the United States are not within the scope of the 1925 Act, regard-
less of whether an American citizen is a party to the contract. 7
Although the courts were generally more prone to uphold the
validity of arbitration agreements after the passage of the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925, certain kinds of issues were still considered
to be nonarbitrable by their very nature. A brief discussion of partic-
ular disputes between domestic parties which are deemed to be non-
arbitrable by U.S. courts will provide a useful backdrop for the ex-
amination of the aspects of international arbitration.
The plaintiff in Wilko v. Swans was a purchaser of securities
who brought suit against a brokerage firm to recover damages for
misrepresentation under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933
(1933 Act)." The defendant moved for a stay of proceedings pending
arbitration in accordance with an agreement between the parties. The
district court denied the stay,30 and held that the arbitration agree-
ment deprived the plaintiff of the advantageous court remedy pro-
vided by the 1933 Act. A divided court of appeals reversed,3 1 holding
that the Securities Act of 1933 did not prohibit the agreement from
referring future controversies to arbitration. The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari "to review this important and novel
federal question affecting both the Securities Act and the United
States Arbitration Act." 3 The Supreme Court held that the agree-
ment to arbitrate was void under section 14 of the 1933 Act and re-
versed. Section 14 states: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with
any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the
Commission shall be void." The Court found the arbitration agree-
ment to be a "stipulation" and the right to select a judicial forum a
"provision" which could not be waived under section 14.
In reaching its decision, the Court recognized the conflict be-
tween the Securities Act of 1933, which was enacted by Congress to
protect the rights of investors and which forbids a waiver of any of
26. Id. § 4.
27. Id. § 2.
28. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
29. 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77a.
30. See Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
31. See Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953).
32. 346 U.S. at 430.
33. 48 Stat. 84 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976)).
VOL. 9:119
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
these rights, and the United States Arbitration Act which "estab-
lishes by statute the desirability of arbitration as an alternative to
the complications of litigation."u In ultimately concluding that "the
intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is better car-
ried out by holding invalid . . .an agreement for arbitration of is-
sues arising under the [1933] Act,"" the Court stated that "the pro-
tective provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of
judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness, ' 3 and that
"Congress must have intended § 14 . . . to apply to a waiver of
judicial trial and review.""
Wilko is considered to be a leading decision concerning the issue
of whether federal law precludes certain matters from being submit-
ted to arbitration. Relying on Wilko, American Safety Equip. Corp.
v. J. P. Maguire & Co. 38 held that antitrust claims may not be set-
tled by arbitration. The case concerned the grant by Hickok Manu-
facturing Company (Hickok) of an exclusive license to American
Safety Equipment Corporation (ASE) to use the Hickok trademark
in connection with safety protective devices and accessories. Para-
graph 3 of the license agreement provided for royalties based on
ASE's total annual sales of safety protective devices whether or not
the Hickok trademarks were used, and on accessories if sold under
trademark. Paragraph 27 permitted ASE to grant sublicenses for ter-
ritories outside the United States subject to approval by Hickok, if
certain conditions were met, the most important of which was that a
sublicensee could not be "a competitor of Hickok or of any of its
licensees with respect to any products sold or dealt with by said pro-
posed licensee." 9 The license also provided for disputes and claims
arising out of the agreement to be settled by arbitration.
In 1966, three years after the license had been granted, ASE
sought a declaratory judgment in the district court that the license
agreement was void ab initio and that no obligations had or would
accrue under it. The complaint alleged that certain paragraphs of
the agreement unlawfully extended Hickok's trademark monopoly
and unreasonably restricted ASE's business and, therefore, violated
the Sherman Act. 0 Maguire, claiming to be an assignee of Hickok's
royalty rights, invoked the arbitration clause claiming royalties due
34. 346 U.S. at 431.
35. Id. at 438.
36. Id. at 437.
37. Id.
38. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
39. Id. at 822.
40. Id. at 823.
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under the license agreement. ASE filed another declaratory action
against Maguire, repeating the relief requested against Hickok, and
seeking an injunction against the arbitration proceeding commenced
by Maguire. ASE asserted that the district court had exclusive juris-
diction to determine the existence of antitrust violations. In addi-
tion, it claimed that the purported assignment was invalid and,
therefore, Maguire had no right to demand arbitration under the
agreement. The district court not only held that the validity of the
assignment should be resolved in arbitration, but also found the ar-
bitration clause to be broad enough to encompass claims of antitrust
violations."
On appeal, the court of appeals determined that the district
court had erred in staying ASE's actions and ordering arbitration of
ASE's antitrust allegations. In its opinion the court cited Wilko v.
Swan:42
We think that the remedy a statute provides for violation of the
statutory rights it creates may be sought not only in any "court
of competent jurisdiction" but also in any other competent tri-
bunal, such as arbitration, unless the right itself is of a character
inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration. (Emphasis
supplied.)a
The court recognized a "conflict between federal statutory protection
of a large segment of the public, frequently in an inferior bargaining
position, and encouragement of arbitration."" It went on to compare
a plaintiff asserting rights under the Sherman Act to a "private at-
torney-general who protects the public's interest."''5 Noting that an-
titrust violations can affect staggering numbers of people, the court
believed that Congress intended such claims only to be resolved in
the courts. Even if all antitrust litigations do not reach such swollen
proportions, "a rule to govern the arbitrability of antitrust claims,
...must consider the rule's potential effect."
Furthermore, the court found "the issues in antitrust cases are
prone to be complicated, and the evidence extensive and diverse, far
better suited to judicial than to arbitration procedures."' 7 In addi-
tion, because commercial arbitrators are often chosen for their busi-
41. See American Safety Equip. Corp. v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 271 F. Supp. 961
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
42. 201 F.2d at 444.
43. 391 F.2d at 825.
44. Id. at 826.
45. Id.




ness expertise, and it is the business community that generally is
regulated by the antitrust laws, it would not seem appropriate for
arbitrators to determine these kinds of issues. 8
Although the court determined potential antitrust violations to
be outside the realm of arbitration, it expressed general support for
the enforcement of arbitration clauses in most instances. The opin-
ion makes reference to a few cases where the court upheld arbitra-
tion clauses." Even in this decision it found the antitrust claims to
be severable, and thus, the other disputes would be appropriate for
arbitration.
The defense of nonarbitrable subject matter also proved success-
ful in a patent dispute, Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical
Dev. Corp.50 Beckman refused to pay royalties on an apparatus cov-
ered by a patent it had sublicensed from Technical. Pursuant to the
terms of the agreement, Technical demanded that the dispute be
submitted to arbitration. Beckman then filed a complaint in the dis-
trict court challenging the validity of the patent. Relying solely upon
the doctrine of licensee estoppel," the district court entered judg-
ment for Technical. The district court also vacated its prior order
staying all judicial proceedings pending arbitration,' and entered an
order restraining arbitration during the pendency of the appeal.
Two months after the district court reached its decision, the
court of appeals found that the doctrine of licensee estoppel had
been overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins.5"
The court of appeals then determined that the parties did not ex-
pressly provide for arbitration of patent validity questions, and in
any event, "such questions are inappropriate for arbitration proceed-
ings and should be decided by a court of law, given the great public
interest in challenging invalid patents."" The court of appeals cited
the language of the district court in affirming their decision as to the
48. Id.
49. Id. at n.11. The court makes reference to Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General
Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); and Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General
Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, 949-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
50. 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970).
51. Under the doctrine of licensee estoppel, a licensee was generally estopped from
challenging the validity of the patent on any ground, especially where the licensee had
acknowledged the validity of the patent and agreed not to contest it. "The general rule
is that the licensee under a patent license agreement may not challenge the validity of
the licensed patent in a suit for royalties under the contract." Automatic Radio Mfg.
Co., Inc. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 836 (1950), rehearing denied, 340
U.S. 846 (1950).
52. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
53. 433 F.2d at 63.
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arbitrability of patent disputes:
The complex principles of patent law which a court must con-
sider and apply when deciding issues of validity and infringe-
ment, affect important questions of public policy and public
rights. In considering the validity of patent claims, a court
makes decisions crucial not only to the parties involved, but of
vital importance to the public generally."
Thus, the court held that issues concerning the validity of a U.S.
patent were incapable of being determined by arbitration
proceedings.
Federal Arbitration Act of 1970
After the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, U.S.
courts increasingly acknowledged the validity of arbitration agree-
ments. However, certain categories of disputes were still considered
to be nonarbitrable under U.S. law. As explained above, the most
prominent categories which were deemed to be nonarbitrable were
those disputes which concerned patent validity, antitrust -claims,
and disputes arising under the securities laws.
In 1970 the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 was amended in or-
der to effect the United States' enforcement of the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards. The implementing legislation to the Conventions is really
an additional chapter (1970 Act) to the 1925 Act rather than an
amendment in the true sense of the word. The 1970 Act is comprised
of eight short sections (sections 201-208). Section 202 states that an
arbitration agreement or arbitral award that arises out of legal rela-
tionships which are considered commercial (whether or not contrac-
tual) falls within the Convention. If United States citizens are the
only parties to such an agreement, the Convention will not apply
"unless that relationship involves property located abroad, or has
some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states."5 6
Section 203 grants original jurisdiction to the federal district
courts for actions which fall under the Convention, regardless of the
amount in controversy. Other important sections of the 1970 Act in-
clude section 205 which allows the defendant in an enforcement pro-
ceeding to remove the action from a state to a federal court. Section
54. Id.
55. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1976). For an analysis of the 1970 Act and general back-
ground of federal arbitration legislation, see Swisher, International Commercial Arbi-
tration Under the United Nations Convention and the Amended Federal Arbitration
Statute, 47 WASH. L. Rav. 441 (1972).
56. 9 U.S.C. § 202.
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206 allows the court to "direct that arbitration be held in accordance
with the agreement at any place therein provided for, whether that
place is within or without the United States."'7 In addition, the
court may appoint the arbitrators pursuant to the provisions of the
agreement.
Section 207 allows a party to have an arbitral award confirmed
in a court of competent jurisdiction within three years unless an Ar-
ticle V Convention defense is proved. The last section states that the
.1925 Act "applies to actions and proceedings brought under this
chapter to the extent that chapter is not in conflict with this chapter
or the Convention as ratified by the United States. '"
Thus, the implementation of the Convention by the United
States has upgraded the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Not
only have United States courts upheld international arbitral awards
more readily, but they have construed defenses against arbitration
very narrowly. Such defenses are pleaded on the basis of (1) proce-
dural due process; (2) nonarbitrable subject matter; (3) manifest dis-
regard of the law by the arbitrators; (4) forum non conveniens; (5) a
conflict with United States national policy or domestic law; or (6)
issues which are contrary to public policy.5'
The only two defenses which the court may evoke ex officio are
the nonarbitrable subject matter defense and the contrary to public
policy defense. Some authors have commented on the intertwining
nature of these two defenses.60 In any event, the nonarbitrable sub-
ject matter defense is the most narrowly construed, and is worthy of
discussion in depth. To illustrate how the courts have interpreted
this defense when it has arisen from an international, rather than a
domestic contract, it will be helpful to explore a few of the cases in
which the defense has been pleaded.
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court issued one of its most
important decisions in support of international commercial arbitra-
tion, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co." Alberto-Culver Co., an Ameri-
can corporation, purchased three businesses organized under the
laws of Germany and Liechtenstein from Fritz Scherk, a German cit-
izen, together with all trademark rights of the businesses. The sales
contract was negotiated in the United States, England, and Ger-
57. Id. § 206.
58. Id. § 208.
59. Junker, The Public Policy Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 231 (1979).
60. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 3, at 270.
61. 417 U.S. 506 (1974), rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
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many, signed in Austria, and closed in Switzerland. The contract
contained express warranties by Scherk that the trademarks were
unencumbered, and a clause which stated that all disputes arising
out of the contract would be referred to arbitration before the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce in Paris.
One year after the transaction was closed, Alberto-Culver alleg-
edly discovered that the trademark rights were subject to substantial
encumbrances. After Scherk refused Alberto-Culver's offer to rescind
the contract, Alberto-Culver brought suit in federal district court
contending that Scherk's fraudulent representations of the status of
the trademark rights constituted violations of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,12 and Rule 10b-513 promulgated
thereunder.
Scherk filed a motion to dismiss the action pending arbitration
before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris pursuant to
the contract, and Alberto-Culver sought a preliminary order en-
joining Scherk from proceeding with arbitration. The district court,
relying entirely on Wilko v. Swan,"' granted a preliminary order en-
joining Scherk from proceeding with arbitration.65 The Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed,6 also relying upon the Wilko deci-
sion, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing Wilko on the
grounds that "Alberto-Culver's contract to purchase the business en-
tities belonging to Scherk was a truly international agreement" 7 and
that "such a contract involves considerations and policies signifi-
cantly different from those found controlling in Wilko." 6 The Court
acknowledged that in Wilko "no credible claim could have been en-
tertained that any international conflict-of-laws problems would
arise" 9 because the parties, negotiations, and subject matter of the
contract were all situated in the United States. In contrast to Wilko,
in Scherk serious uncertainty would exist concerning the law to be
applied to any dispute arising out of the contract in the absence of
an arbitration agreement. The Court recognized that "[sluch un-
certainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract
touching two or more countries, each with its own substantive laws
62. 48 Stat. 891 (1934), (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976)).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
64. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
65. 417 U.S. 506.
66. See Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973).
67. 417 U.S. at 515.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 516.
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and conflict-of-laws rules."7 Choice-of-law and choice-of-forum pro-
visions are almost "indispensable precondition(s) to achievement of
the orderliness and predictability essential to any international
business transaction."' Therefore, a refusal by national courts to
enforce an international arbitration agreement "would invite un-
seemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure
tactical litigation advantages.""
Although both Wilko and Scherk involved disputes concerning
violations of the securities laws, the Court justified its differential
treatment of the two cases by stating:
The exception of the clear provisions of the Arbitration Act
carved out by Wilko is simply inapposite to a case such as the
one before us. In Wilko the Court reasoned that "[w]hen the se-
curity buyer, prior to any violation of the Securities Act, waives
his right to sue in courts, he gives up more than would a partici-
pant in other business transactions. The security buyer has a
wider choice of courts and venue. He thus surrenders one of the
advantages the Act gives him . . . ." 346 U.S. at 435, 74 S.Ct.
at 187. In the context of an international contract, however,
these advantages become chimerical since, as indicated above,
an opposing party may by speedy resort to a foreign court block
or hinder access to the American court of the purchaser's
choice.73
Thus, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the arbitration agree-
ment was to be enforced by the federal courts in accordance with the
provisions of the Arbitration Act. In a footnote to its opinion the
Court also recognized that the decision was supported by "interna-
tional developments and domestic legislation in the area of commer-
cial arbitration subsequent to the Wilko decision,"" specifically re-
ferring to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the federal legislation
which implemented the Convention.
In reversing a preliminary order enjoining Scherk from proceed-
ing with arbitration, the Supreme Court sternly limited the Wilko
decision as applied to international agreements. Although the Court
did not rely on the Convention as primary authority for its holding, by
recognizing that the United States' accession to the Convention was
indicative of congressional policy, it set an important precedent
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 516-17.
73. Id. at 517-18.
74. Id. at 520, n.15.
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for future interpretations. It is important to note that Justice Doug-
las, in a strong dissenting opinion, still felt that the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 rendered the case nonarbitrable. He emphasized
that the victims were not the Alberto-Culver Corporation, but rather
the thousands of investors who were security holders-the very
"wards" which the 1934 Act seeks to protect." While acknowledging
that the majority rested its decision on the fact that this was an
international agreement, he pointed out that the Convention "pro-
vides that a forum court in which a suit is brought need not enforce
an agreement to arbitrate which is 'void' and 'inoperative' as con-
trary to public policy."" He maintained that "section 29 of the 1934
Act, which renders arbitration clauses void and inoperative, recog-
nizes no exception for fraudulent dealings which incidentally have
some international factors.""
Shortly after the Scherk decision was handed down by the Su-
preme Court, a U.S. district court in Texas was confronted with a
similar case on a domestic level. The plaintiff in Newman v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc.71 brought suit against the defendant,
a broker-dealer, alleging numerous violations of the registration and
antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The defendant filed a motion to stay the ac-
tion and to order arbitration pursuant to the United States Arbitra-
tion Act. As in Wilko, the court was forced to reconcile "strong pub-
lic policy in favor of arbitration" with the 1933 and 1934 Acts which
prohibit agreements to arbitrate controversies concerning alleged vi-
olations of the federal securities laws. 7
In ultimately denying the defendant's motion to order arbitra-
tion, the court held that "the reasoning and logic of the Wilko hold-
ing are compelling and have been consistently followed in subse-
quent cases involving the 1933 Act, as well as in cases involving the
Exchange Act." ° A significant aspect of the court's opinion is that it
specifically ruled as "incorrect" the defendant's contention that
Wilko was overruled by Scherk. Rather, the court stated that Scherk
"simply carved out a narrow exception to the Wilko holding, and is
applicable only to international transactions."'" Thus, the court
seemed to indicate that there are strong public policy considerations
75. Id. at 527.
76. Id. at 530.
77. Id. at 534.
78. 383 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
79. Id. at 267.




that encourage arbitration of international disputes which, on a do-
mestic level, might be deemed nonarbitrable under U.S. law.
In late 1974, a United States court finally enforced a foreign ar-
bitral award based on the amended legislation to the Federal Arbi-
tration Act which implemented the United States' accession to the
Convention. The case was Parsons & Wittemore Overseas Co. (Over-
seas) v. Sociktk Gn6rale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) 2 and it
involved several Convention Article V defenses invoked by a United
States corporation, Overseas, against confirmation of a foreign arbi-
tral award in favor of the Egyptian corporation, RAKTA.
Overseas had contracted with RAKTA in 1962 to construct,
manage, and supervise a mill in Egypt. Included in the contract's
terms was an arbitration clause to settle any differences which might
arise and a force majeure clause which excused delay in performance
due to factors beyond Overseas' control. In 1967, the Arab-Israeli
Six-Day War erupted causing the majority of the Overseas crew to
leave Egypt. On June 6, the Egyptian Government ordered all Amer-
icans expelled from Egypt except those who would apply and qualify
for special visas. Overseas, relying on the force majeure clause, aban-
doned the project. RAKTA invoked the arbitration clause, seeking
damages for breach of contract, and was successful. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York con-
firmed the foreign arbitral award s and Overseas appealed. Overseas
raised the following defenses against arbitration: (1) that it was con-
trary to public policy; (2) that the subject matter was nonarbitrable;
(3) that there would be denial of due process; and (4) that it would
involve resolution of issues not within the scope of the matters sub-
mitted to arbitration. Construing all of the defenses narrowly, the
second circuit rejected each defense and affirmed the district
court's confirmation of the award. Specifically, the court construed
Overseas' public policy defense strictly, declaring that "enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis only where
enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic notions of
morality and justice."'" It recognized the loophole that could be
created and noted that the provision under the Convention "was not
meant to enshrine the vagaries of international politics under the
rubric of 'public policy.' "s
With regard to the Article V (2)(a) defense of nonarbitrable sub-
82. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
83. Id. at 971.
84. Id. at 974.
85. Id.
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ject matter, the court stated that the United States might accept
such a defense when enforcement of an award involving arbitration
of an antitrust claim was involved,8 as in American Safety Equip.
Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co. 7 However, the court limited the defense
even further by declaring, "[o]n the other hand, it may well be that
the special considerations and policies underlying a 'truly interna-
tional agreement'" as in Scherk "call for a narrower view of
nonarbitrability in the international than domestic context," as in
Wilko.u However, the court did not even have to deal with such fine
distinctions; a dispute is not made nonarbitrable merely because an
issue of national interest may incidentally figure into the breach of
contract claim. "Rather, certain categories of claims may be nonar-
bitrable because of the special national interest vested in their reso-
lution." '89 The court also believed that Overseas "grossly exaggerated
the magnitude of the national interest involved in the resolution of
its particular claim. Simply because acts of the United States are
somehow implicated in a case one cannot conclude that the United
States is vitally interested in its outcome." Finally, by analogy, the
court concluded that since the Supreme Court decided in favor of
arbitration in the more prominent Scherk case, the foreign award
against Overseas dealt with a subject arbitrable under United States
law.
In 1976 the United States Court of Appeals, District of Colum-
bia decided the case of Hanes Corp. v. Millard,"' in which the court
had to determine the enforceability of an arbitration clause in an
international licensing agreement. The agreement contained a clause
which provided that any dispute arising from the contract would be
settled before the International Chamber of Commerce according to
its rules of conciliation and arbitration.
The facts of the case are quite complicated, but in condensed
form, the case involved three French citizens who assigned their
86. Id. Five years later the District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that it would be inappropriate to permit an international tribunal to arbitrate a
Sherman Act claim in view of the strong public interest in private enforcement of the
U.S. antitrust laws. The court, however, did stay the action pending arbitration of the
other alleged claims which could be determined before an international tribunal. See
Socidt6 Nationale pour la Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la Transformation
et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures v. General Tire & Rubber Co. 430 F.
Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
87. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
88. 508 F.2d at 974.
89. Id. at 975.
90. Id.
91. 531 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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rights in a U.S. patent to Hanes, a United States corporation. The
patent rights expired in 1969, and in 1973 the Frenchmen filed a re-
quest for conciliation with the International Chamber of Commerce
in Paris, pursuant to the agreement, alleging a claim for unpaid roy-
alties during the life of the patent. Rather than pursuing conciliation
and arbitration, Hanes brought suit seeking a declaration that the
patent did not extend to the products in question, or alternatively,
was invalid. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or stay the
action pending arbitration. After denying the motion, the district
judge raised the issue of the statute of limitations and instructed the
parties to file supplemental briefs. Hanes then filed a supplemental
brief and an amended complaint in which a newly-added Count II
requested the court to declare any royalty claims to be barred by the
statute of limitations. The district court entered summary judgment
for Hanes on Count II, stating that although an action for patent
infringement could still be maintained, an action for breach of con-
tract was barred by the statute of limitations. The district court also
held Hanes' claims in Count I regarding the scope and validity of the
patent were "either moot or premature"; moot, insofar as they re-
lated to threatened contract claims which were barred by the statute
of limitations, and premature, insofar as they might relate to an ac-
tion for patent infringement which had not been threatened."
Upon appeal, the circuit court noted that "one of the most...
appropriate uses of the declaratory judgment procedure is to enable
one who has been charged with patent infringement to secure a
binding determination of whether proposed conduct will infringe a
patent . . .without waiting until he becomes the defendant in an
actual infringement suit."'" The court also declared that "[tihe pur-
pose of granting declaratory relief to one potentially liable for in-
fringement is to allow him to know in advance whether he may le-
gally pursue a particular course of conduct."" However, because the
patent had already expired in this case, "[n]o future activity on the
part of Hanes [would] . . . affect the liability it may have incurred
during the patent's life."" Hanes was "simply in the position of one
expecting to be sued for past alleged transactions."" Nonetheless,
the court determined that with regard to Count I there would have
been a "useful purpose" served had the district court granted declar-
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atory relief as Hanes originally requested. 7 The court emphasized
that, while there is no obstacle to having state as well as federal
courts adjudicate issues of patent validity, in this case the alterna-
tive to federal adjudication would have been to leave the issues of
patent scope and validity to an arbitration panel. The court noted
that complex issues of patent validity concern questions that may be
unfamiliar to arbitrators, especially if the members of the arbitra-
tion panel are not lawyers or are citizens of a foreign country. The
court also recognized that "the expertise of arbitrators has always
lain in resolving . ..contractual disputes rather than in interpret-
ing the import of complicated federal legislation."" Furthermore, if
the arbitration panel were to determine that the issues of patent law
were nonarbitrable, as in Beckman, "it is possible that the next tri-
bunal to face these issues-most likely one called upon to review or
enforce an arbitration award-would be a court in a foreign country,
again not a desirable forum for determining the scope and validity of
[a] United States [platent . . . ."" Therefore, the court held that
the district judge "would not have acted improperly had he enter-
tained and proceeded to resolution of the declaratory relief that was
originally sought.""'
The circuit court, however, did reach a different conclusion with
regard to the arbitrability of Count II of the complaint. The court
realized that the advantages of arbitration are especially important
when the dispute is international in character. Relying on Scherk,
the court stated that the international character of an arbitration
agreement constituted a special reason for judicial deference to the
arbitral process, especially in order to limit the uncertainties inher-
ently attendant upon international trade and commerce. Therefore,
the court held that the district court's assumption of declaratory
judgment over Count II which displaced the international arbitra-
tion proceeding was improper. The court stated that:
The Frenchmen are not likely to be familiar with the statutes of
limitations and choice of law rules of a particular American ju-
risdiction where suit is brought. Although arbitration has been
criticized for its unpredictability, in the international setting it
may promote certainty by moderating the disparities among un-
familiar and contrasting choice of law rules and statutes of limi-
tations that would govern questions of timeliness in a judicial
proceeding. And as we noted above, the agreement to arbitrate
97. Id. at 593.
98. Id.




may represent, if not a designation by the parties of a particular
statute of limitations to govern all claims, at least a commission
of the authority to select and apply the statute to an arbitrator
expected to be sensitive and sympathetic to the peculiar needs
of international commerce. 02
Thus, although the court held that questions which concerned the
scope and validity of a U.S. patent would be nonarbitrable, the
court did recognize the importance of arbitration, especially in the
internatonal context, and held that Count II of the complaint, re-
garding the statute of limitations would be an appropriate subject
for arbitration.
In 1977, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit decided the
case of Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.1
0 2
The court was faced with "the matter of deciding what effect an ar-
bitration clause in an agreement has upon a claim for relief under
S.E.C. Rule 10b-5.'
'1 3
After opening a trading account and participating in Merrill
Lynch's Money Management Option Program, the plaintiffs had lost
a substantial amount of their investment. Believing that the defen-
dant had misled them with certain untrue and deceptive representa-
tions, the plaintiffs filed suit in the district court alleging: (1) an
action under Rule 10b-5 of the S.E.C. regulations; (2) fraud and de-
ceit; and (3) breach of contract. Relying on the arbitration clause in
the agreement, the defendant moved for a stay of proceedings. The
district court held that the 10b-5 action was not subject to arbitra-
tion, but that the fraud and contract claims were properly
arbitrable.
Upon appeal, the court of appeals discussed both the Wilko and
Scherk cases. The court recognized that Scherk had held an interna-
tional agreement containing an arbitration clause to be enforceable
against a claim arising under Rule 10b-5. However, the court empha-
sized that Scherk noted the "crucial differences" between an inter-
national agreement and the agreement involved in Wilko, and upon
weighing the policies embodied in the federal securities laws, the
court in Scherk concluded that the arbitration clause should be
given deference. Specifically citing Scherk, the court stated:
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce
an international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate
these purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually de-
101. Id. at 599.
102. 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977).
103. Id. at 832.
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structive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation ad-
vantages. In the present case, for example, it is not inconceiv-
able that if Scherk had anticipated that Alberto-Culver would
be able in this country to enjoin resort to arbitration he might
have sought an order in France or some other country enjoining
Alberto-Culver from proceeding with its litigation in the United
States. Whatever recognition the courts of this country might
ultimately have granted to the order of the foreign court, the
dicey atmosphere of such a legal no-man's-land would surely
damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and im-
peril the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into in-
ternational commercial agreements.'"
The court noted, however, that Scherk did not address the issue of
whether an arbitration clause would be enforced against a 10b-5 ac-
tion where there were no international dimensions involved. Quoting
from Scherk, the court stated that "[cloncededly, situations may
arise where the contacts with foreign countries are so insignificant
or attenuated that the holding in Wilko would meaningfully apply.
Judicial response to such situations can and should await future
litigation in concrete cases."'' 5
Nonetheless, the defendant contended that Wilko should not be
applied because the "right of action under Rule 10b-5 has been judi-
cially created and that, therefore, there would be no violation of the
anti-waiver provision, Section 29(a), of the 1934 Act."'0 6
In affirming the district court's holding that the 10b-5 action
was nonarbitrable, the court stated that "[t]he differences between
the 1933 and 1934 Acts notwithstanding, we nevertheless continue to
adhere to our belief that policy considerations mandate the applica-
tion of Wilko to Rule 10b-5 situations absent the presence of interna-
tional concerns. ' ' 07
In 1978 the tenth circuit decided Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith v. Moore, '" a case which involved a situation almost identi-
cal to that which the seventh circuit had faced in Weissbuch. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated section 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5. The district court ordered the parties to
proceed to arbitration pursuant to their agreement, and the plain-
tiffs appealed.
104. Id. at 834.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 835.
107. Id.
108. 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978).
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After determining that Wilko prohibited the claims arising out
of the 1933 Act from being arbitrated, the tenth circuit was then
faced with determining whether Wilko also applied to section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. The court recognized that Congress
carried the policy contained in section 14 of the 1933 Act, which ren-
ders stipulations for arbitration void, into the 1934 Act. Section
29(a) of the 1934 Act states: "Any condition, stipulation, or provi-
sion binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of
this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of
an exchange thereby shall be void."'" Merrill Lynch then asserted
that Wilko had been limited by the Supreme Court in Scherk. The
court held that:
In the case at bar, like the Wilko case which is distin-
guished in Scherk, there is no question but that the laws of the
United States generally, and the federal securities laws in par-
ticular, would govern disputes arising out of stock purchase
agreements. The parties, the negotiations and the subject matter
were all within this country and no international conflicts of
laws problem exists. Scherk does not, therefore, apply to the in-
stant case." 0
Referring to Wilko v. Swan,"' Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
Inc.,"' and Sibley v. Tandy,"' the court observed that "there has
been an almost universal tendency in these decisions to distinguish
Scherk.""' Thus, the court ultimately reversed the decision of the
district court and held that all claims arising out of violations of the
1933 and 1934 Acts were nonarbitrable.
CONCLUSION
In sum, it is evident that international commercial arbitration is
being seriously recognized by United States courts as a means of set-
tling disputes between parties to transnational contracts. Especially
after the United States acceded to the United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
and implemented the accompanying legislation which amended the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, United States courts have shown
increasing support for international commercial arbitration. De-
fenses to foreign arbitral awards are being construed narrowly with
the possible exceptions of patent and antitrust disputes. However, if
109. 48 Stat. 903 (1934), (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1976)).
110. 590 F.2d at 828.
111. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
112. 383 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
113. 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
114. 590 F.2d at 828.
1980
140 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY VOL. 9:119
the agreement is found to be "truly international" as in Scherk, it is
possible that courts will allow support of international commercial
arbitration to overshadow domestic policy. Thus, an arbitration
clause should only be included in an international commercial con-
tract after much forethought and consideration of its ramifications,
as existing case law indicates that the clause will most likely be
enforced.
